When a church preached love yet inflicted harm, congregants walked away…driven out after donors and a political party drafted the narrative while the pews funded the platform.
At a young age, I got the evangelical ick for the first time. It came during the 2000 presidential race, Bush against Gore. From the pulpit, my youth pastor made his side plain without naming anyone. For one of the first times in my life, I could see, clear as day, that a pastor had gotten something wrong. Maybe not wrong, exactly. Uncouth. He had stepped over a line he was supposed to guard.
My stomach turned. In the years that followed, the church drifted into a rigid conservative posture that felt at odds with everything it had taught us about Jesus. I could not hold the two together. So I did what millions of Americans have done over the past two decades. I went less, and then I stopped going.
When I talk with friends who walked away too, one line keeps coming up: the church got too political. I have never believed that. The church has always been political. It is where people decide who eats, who gets housed, and who gets left out. The question is who wrote the church’s politics, and whom they served.
An older pattern
Around the year 362, the emperor Julian, trying to restore the old gods, complained that the Galileans fed their own poor and the pagans’ poor besides, and he urged his priests to copy them. The early church had patrons and accepted slavery, but it built an alternative economy inside Rome’s hierarchy. Then the empire noticed. After Constantine’s victory in 312, imperial money raised basilicas, and the historian Peter Brown shows that the church grew rich late in the fourth century as aristocratic donors handed it their fortunes.
The American church was always political, and its own members always paid for it. Over the past century, the people writing its politics changed, and so did its direction. Three forces did the work. Business money wrote the first scripts and paid for the megaphone, though never for the pews. Cold War nationalism gave them a sacred national vocabulary. Partisan capture did the damage.
Layered on a generational decline that was coming anyway, that capture helps explain why the American exodus came late and sorted by party. Underneath all three forces runs a hypocrisy people can see. A church that preaches love and serves a donor, blesses a party, or shields an abuser is saying one thing and doing another. That gap, more than politics as such, is what many people tell pollsters they are running from.
I will call the healthier politics a liberation gospel: local, relational, and aimed at the people with the least. I will call the other a hegemonic gospel: written above the congregation and ready to impose “God’s principles” on a plural society. Both seek laws. The difference is who writes the agenda and whom it serves.
My subject is American Protestants: white evangelicals above all, along with the mainline, Black churches, and a prosperity movement that crosses racial lines. Catholics have lost more people than anyone; Pew counts 8.4 adults raised Catholic who have left for every one who has joined. Their exodus has its own engine. In PRRI’s 2024 survey, 45 percent of former Catholics cited clergy sexual abuse scandals, and the economists Bottan and Perez-Truglia found that local scandals cut Catholic participation by about 9 percent, and the drop persisted. That story needs its own essay, though it ends at the same hypocrisy.
The sponsors
On Sunday, July 1, 1951, thousands of American pastors preached on the same theme: “Freedom Under God.” Many were competing for cash prizes. The campaign rang church bells at noon on the Fourth, aired a CBS broadcast with Jimmy Stewart and Bing Crosby, and drew 50,000 people to the Los Angeles Coliseum. The sponsor was a group called Spiritual Mobilization.
James W. Fifield Jr., a Congregational pastor in Los Angeles, had founded Spiritual Mobilization in 1935 to fight the New Deal. As the historian Kevin Kruse documents in One Nation Under God, its backers included J. Howard Pew of Sun Oil, Alfred Sloan of General Motors, and leaders of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Business had tried a secular campaign against Roosevelt, the American Liberty League, and the public shrugged it off. So the industrialists went looking for moral authority in the pulpit.
The money was modest, a 1947 budget of $270,000, about $3 million in 2015 dollars by Kruse’s estimate. The reach was not. Spiritual Mobilization enlisted roughly 17,000 “minister representatives,” its radio program ran on more than 800 stations by late 1951, and its preachers cast the New Deal as “pagan statism.” Pew put up about $150,000 to help Billy Graham launch Christianity Today in 1956, a thread that runs toward later evangelicals.
The New Deal had religious allies and rich patrons of its own. The Federal Council of Churches’ 1908 “Social Creed” called for a living wage in every industry, and John D. Rockefeller Jr. spent about $10.5 million on the land and building for Riverside Church. The fight was between two political churches with different patrons. Historians such as John Fea, Molly Worthen, and Matthew Avery Sutton argue that the money bought less than it seems: Christian nationalism is far older, and many of these ministers believed what they preached.
Kruse concedes that the economic agenda mostly failed. Eisenhower spoke of a nation under God and kept the New Deal. What stuck was the religious nationalism. “Under God” entered the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954, and “In God We Trust” became the national motto in 1956. The donors never got their tax policy. They got a sacred vocabulary for the nation, and it outlived them.
The sacred nation
On Sunday, February 7, 1954, Dwight Eisenhower sat in a pew at New York Avenue Presbyterian Church in Washington. The Reverend George Docherty preached that the Pledge of Allegiance needed God in it. The Catholic Knights of Columbus had pushed the idea since 1951, and with the president in the pew, the cause gained momentum. Eisenhower signed the change on Flag Day and said schoolchildren would now “daily proclaim” the nation’s dependence on the Almighty.
The historian Jonathan Herzog calls the machine behind that scene a “spiritual-industrial complex”: government, the military, big companies, Madison Avenue, and clergy working to make faith a badge of loyalty against communism. Religion in American Life, an Ad Council campaign headed by General Electric’s president, put up more than 5,200 billboards in its first month. Conrad Hilton, from the 1951 Freedom Under God committee, hosted the first National Prayer Breakfast in 1953.
The creed was generic on purpose. In December 1952, Eisenhower said government makes no sense if it is not “founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.” Will Herberg saw three faiths resting on one shared religion, “the American Way of Life.”
Then moral questions went national: school prayer rulings in 1962 and 1963, Roe in 1973, and the fight over tax breaks for church schools. Robert Wuthnow traced the result: denominational loyalty faded, and Herberg’s three faiths regrouped into two camps, liberal and conservative, inside every denomination.
The vocabulary was never one side’s property, and King used the same covenant language to indict Jim Crow. But one camp claimed the inheritance. Samuel Perry and Andrew Whitehead find that Christian nationalism predicts views on immigration, race, and Trump better than church attendance does, and in 2025, PRRI found that 56 percent of Republicans hold or lean toward Christian nationalist views, against 17 percent of Democrats. The hegemonic gospel is 1950s civil religion with a party attached, and a narrower creed.
The movement and the market
The party came in the 1970s. The historian Randall Balmer argues that the Religious Right began with schools rather than abortion. In 1976 the IRS revoked Bob Jones University’s tax exemption over its racial policies, and two years later proposed rules for private Christian academies drew about 150,000 letters, most of them hostile. Balmer’s reading is contested, and abortion soon became the movement’s banner. The operative Paul Weyrich found that federal pressure on Christian schools rallied people where school prayer had not, and he and Jerry Falwell founded the Moral Majority in June 1979.
None of this was conjured from a boardroom. The historian Darren Dochuk traces the movement’s roots to Southern migrants who carried their Baptist, Holiness, and Pentecostal congregations to postwar California. Lisa McGirr found its early activists in Orange County, among housewives, engineers, dentists, and veterans who met over coffee in the 1950s and 1960s. Daniel K. Williams shows the national mobilization of the mid-1970s growing from decades of evangelical organizing. Millions held their convictions on abortion and family in good faith, from the ground up. The donors and operatives did not create that movement; they organized it, amplified it, and steered it toward one party.
In the same years, churches learned to think like firms. Peter Drucker mentored the pastors who built the megachurch model, and in 1998 he called pastoral megachurches “the most important social phenomenon” of the previous thirty years. The prosperity gospel, which reads wealth as a sign of divine favor, rode the same wave, though its roots are older. Around 1900, Pentecostal fervor fused with New Thought, and after World War II Oral Roberts turned it into “seed faith” giving.
Cable, satellite, and megachurch real estate scaled this theology into a mass market, and they produced spectacular abuse. Jim Bakker’s PTL ministry sold 159,903 “lifetime partnerships” at $1,000 apiece after promising to cap them at 25,000, and a federal jury convicted him on all 24 counts of fraud in 1989. In 2007, Senator Chuck Grassley opened an inquiry into six prosperity ministries, Paula White’s among them. It ended in 2011 with no subpoenas and no penalties, and White went on to become Donald Trump’s spiritual adviser and, in 2025, head of the White House Faith Office.
The prosperity gospel draws its strongest support from Black and Hispanic believers, and a 2015 YouGov survey of evangelicals found that the racial gap held across income levels. Kate Bowler, the movement’s best historian, reads it as a theology of hope for strivers. If the economy tells you that nothing you do will change your life, a God who rewards faith with a down payment is a rational God to pray to. The trouble lies at the top. A theology that measures blessing in dollars turns the preacher’s jet into proof of doctrine and tells the wealthy that the order which rewarded them is the order God intended. That belief is the hinge between the prosperity gospel and the hegemonic one.
The Black church test
The Black church is the clearest test of whether politics itself corrupts a congregation. Nobody looks back on Montgomery and calls it “too political.” Yet most Black churches stayed out of direct action. The largest Black denomination, the National Baptist Convention, was led for three decades by a president who opposed King’s tactics. After a 1961 floor fight in Kansas City, in which a delegate was injured and later died, he blamed King. King’s allies walked out and founded the Progressive National Baptist Convention.
The liberation strand was a minority that had to break away before it could act. It chose its politics from below and paid for those choices in its own bodies. It had patrons too. The Voter Education Project, launched in 1962, ran on money from the Taconic, Field, and Stern foundations, and the Kennedy White House leaned on foundations to fund it, hoping to steer activists from protest toward registration. King gave his hardest economic warning from Riverside Church, the pulpit Rockefeller built. There, in 1967, he said that when “profit motives and property rights” outrank people, the “giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism, and militarism” cannot be conquered.
The prosperity gospel reached Black pulpits too. Eddie Long grew New Birth outside Atlanta from about 300 members in 1987 to about 25,000 by 2010, and a 2005 Atlanta Journal-Constitution report found that his charity had provided him about $3.07 million over four years. In 2015, Creflo Dollar asked his followers to help buy a $65 million jet.
The test cuts the other way too. In 2016, Pew found that 28 percent of Black Protestant churchgoers had heard their clergy speak in support of Hillary Clinton. By my own standard, a candidate’s campaign carried through the pulpit is capture, whichever party it serves, and I will not exempt it. Black churches have lost ground as well. In Pew’s 2021 survey, 28 percent of Black Gen Z adults and 33 percent of Black Millennials claimed no religion, against 11 percent of Boomers, and by 2023 and 2024 the Black Christian share had fallen to 73 percent, from 85 percent in 2007. I have found no survey that ties that exit to partisan pulpits or prosperity preaching, so I will not claim it.
Politics does not corrupt a congregation. Capture does: a politics, or a gospel of wealth, written outside the congregation and delivered from above.
The pipeline
In August 1980, at a Dallas gathering of evangelical leaders, Ronald Reagan said the quiet part with a smile. “I know you can’t endorse me,” he told them. “But… I want you to know that I endorse you.” The rule he was winking at was the Johnson Amendment, added to the tax code in 1954. It bars 501(c)(3) charities, churches among them, from campaigning for candidates.
The rule held on paper and almost nowhere else. In 72 years, one church has lost its exemption over politics: a New York congregation that bought anti-Clinton newspaper ads in 1992. Pastors who endorse candidates on purpose to dare the IRS have never cost a church its exemption.
Citizens United, in 2010, did not change those rules. It unleashed super PACs and dark-money groups that now reach churches from the side, with voter guides and pastor briefings. In 2020 more dark money helped Democrats than Republicans, but the money aimed at pulpits leans hard to the right.
The Faith & Freedom Coalition spent about $50 million in 2020, set a $62 million goal for 2024, and says it distributes 30 million pieces of literature across 125,000 churches. In 2024, ProPublica reported on Ziklag, a charity whose members must be worth at least $25 million. Its election plans included a pastor program called Steeplechase and $800,000 for challenges to voter rolls.
These are tens of millions of dollars, not billions. Americans gave about $152 billion to religion in 2025, most of it from ordinary members. The pews pay for the pulpit. The political money bought something smaller and sharper: the script, the briefing, the megaphone. And the script sold. Many people in the pews wanted to hear it.
In a 2020 Hartford Institute survey, 63 percent of megachurches said they avoid political talk, and only 14 percent hand out voter guides or push registration. The capture does not run through every pulpit. It runs through networks, broadcasters, briefings, and the media diet of the people in the pews.
Which brings me back to my youth pastor. He did not have to name anyone. In a town as blue as Oak Park, everyone in the room knew whom he meant. That is the craft of it: never say the name, stand on a line the law drew and nobody policed, and let the congregation finish the sentence. I do not know who, if anyone, briefed him. The question I could not ask at that age was who handed him the words, and why the same words seemed to reach so many churches at once.
Now the line itself may move. On July 7, 2025, the IRS told a federal court in Texas that a house of worship talking to its own congregation about candidates was having something like a “family discussion,” and it asked the court to approve that reading. On March 31, 2026, Judge J. Campbell Barker refused on jurisdictional grounds, ruling that his court lacked the power to grant the relief. As of this writing, in October 2026, the case sits on appeal at the Fifth Circuit, the Justice Department has sided with the churches, and no ruling has come. What my youth pastor did on the quiet, the federal government has now asked a court to call legal.
The case against me
If money politics drove Americans out of church, why did Canada empty faster? Its Christian share fell from 77 percent in 2001 to 53 percent in 2021, under strict campaign-finance rules and with no Religious Right of American scale. The sociologists David Voas and Mark Chaves show that the United States follows the same generational pattern as the rest of the West, only later. I accept that. The tide would have come without Jerry Falwell or James Fifield. My argument is about the shape of the wave: its timing and its party colors.
The liberal mainline declined first and fastest, and the evangelical churches I call captured held up best. Pew finds evangelicals slipping from 26 to 23 percent of adults since 2007, against a mainline fall from 18 to 11 percent. Part of the answer is demographic: Michael Hout, Andrew Greeley, and Melissa Wilde attribute most of the mainline decline to low birth rates. Part of it is brand. Once “Christian” came to sound like “Republican,” Democrats and moderates in every tradition had a reason to drop the label, and the political scientist Michele Margolis finds that partisanship often forms first and religious identity follows. Capture recruited Republicans even as it repelled Democrats, which helps explain why the evangelical share held.
The third objection concerns motive. In PRRI’s 2024 survey of people who left their childhood religion, 67 percent said they stopped believing. Forty-seven percent cited negative teachings about or treatment of gay and lesbian people, 31 percent cited clergy sexual abuse scandals, and 20 percent said their congregation became too focused on politics. Politics trails every one of those.
I concede the point on abuse outright, and Protestants have no claim to innocence. In 2022, a seven-month investigation by Guidepost Solutions found that the Southern Baptist Convention’s Executive Committee had stonewalled survivors to protect the denomination from legal liability. Two officials had collected reports of abusive ministers for more than a decade, and the list later released ran to more than 700 entries. That is not partisan capture. It is a second form of the same hypocrisy.
The teaching on gay and lesbian people sits closer to my argument wherever it went to the ballot box. Paul Djupe and his colleagues found that states with campaigns for same-sex marriage bans and heavy conservative Christian activism saw their share of religious “nones” grow faster.
Last, the decline has stalled. Pew finds the Christian share holding near 62 percent since about 2019, and politics has only grown hotter. One reading is that the persuadable have already gone, but that reading could explain any trend, so I should say what would count against me. If capture drives the partisan exit, places thick with pastor briefings and voter guides should show faster Democratic exit than places without them. If they do not, my mechanism is weaker. The strongest contrary evidence so far comes from Djupe and two colleagues, who found that politics pushes out only a few loosely attached members, “a little churn.”
The exodus
So two exits run side by side: a quiet generational drift and a loud, recent, political one. The share of Americans claiming no religion rose from 7 percent in 1987 to 20 percent in 2012. Hout and Claude Fischer credit about two-thirds of that rise to generational succession, and they found the political share concentrated among liberals and moderates, which they read as a recoil from the Religious Right. Moving left politically, they found, roughly doubles a person’s odds of dropping religion, and moving right roughly halves them. Gallup found that church membership among Democrats fell 25 points over two decades, against 12 among Republicans.
For their book Secular Surge, the political scientists David Campbell, Geoffrey Layman, and John Green had people read about religion mixing with politics. Democrats’ religious affiliation fell 13 points, and Republicans did not budge. Ryan Burge found that among Democrats born in the late 1970s, the share who never attend church rose 3 points from 2010 to 2016, then 16 points from 2016 to 2022. That jump is consistent with the evangelical ick at scale, but it does not prove it. The window includes COVID, and those Democrats were not all former evangelicals.
Each force in this story left its print on the exit. Money built the delivery system, from radio sermons in 1951 to voter guides in 2024. Nationalism fused God and flag, so a church’s politics could pass for a test of loyalty. Party capture handed that fusion to one side. Believers on the other side heard the message, and many of them walked.
What they saw was the gap between word and deed. A church that preaches love and then campaigns for a party, shelters an abuser, or treats gay members as a threat is telling its people that its God comes second. Put plainly, you cannot be of God and harm your flock or the world. That is a claim about why people say they leave, not a verdict on every believer who stayed. Faced with that gap, millions of Americans made a rational choice. They stopped buying what the church was selling.
Back to the pew
I still think about that youth pastor. For years I cast him as a villain. Now I see him at the end of a long pipeline, one that ran from the 1951 sermon contest and the 1954 Flag Day pledge through Dallas in 1980 to the voter guides stacked in church lobbies. He may have meant every word. But the vocabulary he reached for, a nation under God with one party on God’s side, was written and amplified long before he took the pulpit.
I do not want churches to stop being political. That would betray Julian’s Galileans and the Baptists who walked out in Kansas City. But in a 2022 Pew survey, 77 percent of Americans said churches should not endorse candidates, including 70 percent of Republicans and 84 percent of Democrats. They are right. A liberal pastor endorsing a Democrat from the pulpit is no cure. It is the same disease with a different donor.
The line that matters is not left against right. It runs between politics that rises from a congregation and politics delivered to it. The first looks like a church that feeds the hungry on its own block, houses the people its city forgot, and speaks hard truths about justice out of what its members endure. The second looks like a sermon contest with cash prizes, a flag-draped creed, a pastors’ lunch with a candidate, a program named Steeplechase.
For a long time I stood in an uneasy middle ground, unsure how my faith and my politics could share a room. The history makes that ground firmer. The Gospels record one scene of Jesus turning violent inside a house of worship. He did not object that people were talking about power there. He overturned the tables where the money changed hands, in a temple its keepers had turned into a marketplace. A church that hands its pulpit to a party, or hides the people who harm its children, has set up its own tables in the temple.
The people leaving American churches have not abandoned a political faith. Many of them have walked away from the tables.
